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Abstract: Economic motives are not the only reasons for committing a
(small) crime. People consider social norms and perceptions of fairness be-
fore judging a situation and acting upon it. If someone takes a bundle of
printing paper from the office for private use at home, then a colleague who
sees this can take action by talking to the offender or someone else (peer
reporting). We investigate how fairness perception influences the decision to
act upon incorrect behavior or not.
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1 Introduction
A young boy goes to a supermarket and sees an expensive pen which he likes
a lot. He puts the pen in his pocket and walks out of the shop, but the shop
assistant has seen him, grabs him, and hands him over to the police. At the
police station, the boy’s father is called and appears.
Father: Son, why did you do this?
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: But you know you should not steal.
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: Why did you not tell me? I could have brought one for
you from the office.
It is the father, rather than the son, who is of interest in this story. Appar-
ently he finds taking a pen from the shop bad, but taking the same pen from
his work not. Why not?
Becker (1968) would explain this by saying that the expected monetary
loss caused by being caught is smaller than the gain obtained by having the
pen. This can be viewed as the traditional economic approach. But there
are many additional or alternative views. Maybe the father’s office lacks
normative pressure (social norms). Normative pressure triggers guilt and
shame, and this may prevent criminal activities (Weibull and Villa, 2005).
A recent field study is the honor-based flower picking business in the Black
Forest in Germany (Schlu¨ter and Vollan, 2011), which relies on the morality
of the customers. Classical economic theory would predict that this market
would break down, but it does not, even though serious money is involved.
This shows that there can be a preference for honesty in a situation where
it is difficult or impossible to detect cheating. This is closely related to
‘conditional cooperation’: people are more likely to comply when a larger
population fraction adheres to the norm (Weibull and Villa, 2005; Traxler,
2010; Traxler and Winter, 2012).
Maybe the father feels it is fair to take a pen from the office. Greenberg
(1990) and Houser et al. (2011) showed that if a situation (like a pay-cut) is
perceived as unfair, employees are more likely to cheat. Honesty is affected
by perceptions of fairness. Or perhaps, the father works in a disorderly
environment. This is the ‘broken windows theory’, which suggests that a
disorderly environment triggers petty crime. An experiment by Keizer et al.
(2008) showed that this may indeed be the case. The father may well work
in a large firm. Gneezy (2005) suggested that fraudulent behavior in a large
organization is considered less severe than against individuals, even if the
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monetary damage is similar, because the consequences of the deception are
valued differently.
To take a pen from the office to give it to your son is a small crime,
a misdemeanor, an example of incorrect behavior. In the current paper
we study another small crime, namely to take home a bundle of printing
paper from the office for private use. Employing our 2008 ‘small crime’
survey taken from a Dutch household panel with about 2000 respondents, two
central survey questions drive our current study: how ‘justifiable’ do you (the
respondent) find the behavior of someone at the office taking paper home?;
and, if this person were your colleague, would you report this behavior? If
so, how? If not, why not?
The answers to these questions will depend on many things. They will
depend on who the person is taking printing paper home (the offender): age,
gender, income, and whether the offender does this often or not. They will
depend on the situation: does the offender’s boss also take paper home for
private use or not, is it likely that someone catches the offender or not. And
they will depend on who the respondent (the reporter) him/herself is: age,
gender, income, education, religion, living in town or not, his/her own history
as a ‘small criminal’, whether the respondent has been a victim of a small
or large crime, and some information on the respondent’s trust and social
norms. All these factors will play a role in our analysis.
In order to answer the question what determines whether the respon-
dent would peer report or not, a major modeling issue arises: one of the
explanatory variables (justifiability) may be endogenous, because both peer
reporting and justifiability are choices of the same individuals and the same
unobservable (’confounding’) factors may be associated with both. To solve
this endogeneity issue, we propose an instrumental-variable-like approach
(not exactly instrumental variables because the model is not linear). We in-
troduce ‘instruments’ for justifiability, confirm their validity with statistical
tests, and estimate a panel data probit model with random individual effects
explaining justifiability as well as peer reporting.
This modeling issue is one of the distinguishing features of the current
paper. Another feature is that, unlike most of the existing literature, we
combine characteristics of the reporter, the offender, and the ‘small crime’
with the justice evaluation and information on a respondent’s past victim-
ization. A third important feature of our study it that our data set consists
of a large representative sample of the Dutch population and is not limited
to students or employees of a specific organization.
Studies in the area of peer reporting and whistleblowing have investigated,
inter alia, factors related to the individual, the situation, the organization,
social context, justice evaluation, and ethical ideology and religion. Sims
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and Keenan (1998) analyzed a sample of 248 full-time employees enrolled
in an undergraduate or graduate business program and found that external
whistleblowing was significantly related to supervisor support, informal poli-
cies, gender, and ideal values. Victor et al. (1993) used a field survey in a
fast food restaurant to test the influences of social context (role responsibility
and interests of group members) and justice evaluations on the respondent’s
inclination to report theft and the actual theft-reporting behavior. Trevino
and Victor (1992) found support for a positive relation between the extent to
which the offender damages the interest of group members and the inclination
to peer report. King and Hermodson (2000) analyzed actual peer reporting
of unethical behavior by colleagues in a sample of 197 registered nurses and
found that the observer’s individual characteristics, situational factors such
as severity of the misdemeanor, as well as organizational issues like compli-
ance or non-compliance with policy and procedures played a significant role.
Barnett et al. (1996) analyzed peer reporting of academic cheating, focusing
on the role of religion and ethical ideology, and found a positive associa-
tion between peer reporting and religiosity among 267 American business
students.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2
we briefly describe the survey design and the elements of the survey relevant
for the current paper. Some descriptive statistics are provided and discussed
in Section 3. The econometric method is explained in Section 4. Our main
equation is an equation for peer reporting, in which justifiability of the com-
mitted offense is one of the explanatory variables. To allow for unobserved
factors correlated with justifiability as well as peer reporting, we treat justifi-
ability as endogenous and estimate an equation for justifiability jointly with
the equation for peer reporting. Estimation results are discussed in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix gives details on the definitions of
respondent and vignette variables used in the analysis.
2 Survey design
The CentERdata research institute at Tilburg University manages a panel
of over two thousand ‘respondents’ (the CentERpanel), who participate in
an online Internet survey on a weekly basis, each week on a different topic.
Respondents are randomly selected from a population register. If they do not
have a computer with Internet access, they are provided with the necessary
equipment. Detailed background information on the respondents is available
from prior surveys and the response rate is generally high. Our ‘small crime’
survey was conducted in the Summer of 2008. A total of 1932 panel members
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completed the survey, amounting to a response rate of about 83%. The
respondents form a representative sample of the Dutch population, aged 16
years and older.
We briefly describe the structure of the survey; a more detailed description
can be found in Douhou et al. (2011) who used the same data source as we
do. The complete questionnaire (in Dutch) is available upon request from
the authors. Our survey was divided into three blocks of questions. The first
block consisted of a set of 24 small offenses, ranging from taking a ballpoint
from the office for private use to accepting a bribe. The respondents were
asked to rate the severity of 18 offenses and the justifiability of six other
offenses.
In the second block we concentrated on six offenses: (i) not having a valid
(train) ticket, (ii) breaking a coffee mug and not reporting it, (iii) taking a
bundle of printing paper, (iv) driving too fast on a highway, (v) accepting
a bribe, and (vi) reporting a lower income than the actual income to the
tax authorities. This time the offenses were described in short stories (‘vi-
gnettes’) concerning hypothetical persons in a hypothetical setting. Each of
the six offenses was described in two vignettes with varying characteristics
of the hypothetical person (the ‘vignette person’) committing the offense,
and of the hypothetical setting. Vignettes have often been used in the social
sciences. They were first introduced in economics by Van Beek et al. (1997)
in the context of employer evaluations of hypothetical job applicants. An
advantage of vignettes is that the characteristics (of offenses and offenders,
in our case) are part of the design, making it possible to create large exoge-
nous variation within and across respondents. Moreover, using hypothetical
offenses rather than offenses actually experienced by the respondents avoids
endogeneity problems (which would arise if characteristics of actually expe-
rienced offenses are correlated to unobserved respondent characteristics) as
well as selection problems (possibly arising if a specific group of respondents
has never experienced the type of offense). The use of vignettes makes it
therefore much easier to obtain consistent and relatively efficient estimates
of how justifiability and peer reporting vary with offense and offender char-
acteristics.
A typical example (concerning offense (iii)) is:
Anne is 27 years old and works at an office. She earns AC1335
per month before tax, a low wage for the type of work she does.
Anne has noticed that her boss occasionally takes printing pa-
per home for private use. Anne takes a bundle of printing paper
home for private use. This is the first time that she does this.
The probability that someone will notice it is very small. Do you
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think Anne’s behavior is never justifiable (1),. . . , always justifi-
able (10)?
In the first variant of this vignette question the vignette person (Anne) earns
AC1335; in the second variant AC2500. Both variants were put to the respon-
dents in the survey. Other items were randomized. In this case, the following
six aspects of the vignettes were randomized:
• Gender: Anne or John;
• Age: 27, 43, or 55 years old;
• Boss: occasionally takes printing paper home for private use, or is a
principled man and never takes things home from work for private use;
• Frequency: this is the first time or Anne does it often;
• Catch: probability of detection is very small or 50%;
• Wage: low or average if wage is AC1335; average or high if wage is
AC2500.
The associated randomized binary vignette variables are presented in more
detail in the Appendix, Table A.1. Note that each respondent sees two
vignettes for each crime, and that in all of these pairs the first vignette always
presents a low-income person and the second vignette a high-income person.
Since the order of the income levels was not randomized, there might be a
‘demand effect’: Respondents realize that income varies between vignettes
and feel that they should react by adjusting their responses. We cannot test
the existence of this effect, but speculate that the repetitive sequencing of
the income levels made the low versus high income treatment variation quite
salient to respondents.
In this paper we concentrate on the above vignette question on taking a
bundle of printing paper from the office, because it was the only one that
was followed by a question on reporting behavior, phrased as follows:
Suppose Anne/John is your colleague, would you report this be-
havior?
The respondents could then choose from the following options:
• Yes,
– I would talk with Anne/John about it (1)
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– I would talk with my colleagues, but not with my boss (2)
– I would immediately report this behavior to my boss (3)
– I would report this to someone else (4);
• No,
– because I am worried about the reaction of my colleagues (5)
– because I am worried about my position within the company (6)
– because I don’t know to whom to report this behavior (7)
– because this is too futile to worry about (8)
– for some other reason (9).
Each respondent thus has to answer two questions in this block: one about
fairness (Is Anne’s behavior justifiable?) and one about peer reporting
(Would you report Anne’s behavior?). It is possible that the response to
the second question is influenced by asking the first question (a framing ef-
fect). Perhaps, if the first question had not been asked, fewer respondents
would have stated that they would talk to the offender. This possible fram-
ing effect could not be investigated in the current study, since the reporting
question was always preceded by the justifiability question.
The third block was designed to provide more detailed background infor-
mation of the respondents. The following two questions about past victim-
ization are particularly relevant:
• Have you been a victim of a serious crime in the past five years (i.e.,
burglary, holdup, violence, or something similar)?
• Have you been a victim of ‘incorrect’ behavior in the past five years?
If either question is answered with ‘yes’, then a follow-up question asks to
rate the severity of the most serious crime on a scale from 1 (very severe)
to 10 (not severe). We used this information to construct an index of self-
reported severity of past victimization. The reason that we only ask about
the past five years is to avoid a bias towards older respondents that have
a higher probability of being victimized. Note that there is a subtle dif-
ference between seriousness and severity of a crime. Seriousness reflects our
judgment, while severity reflects the judgment of the respondent. In the ques-
tionnaire, ‘incorrect’ behavior is defined as an infringement or misdemeanor
which carries (almost) no punishment, but disadvantages others, such as the
government, the employer, co-users of the road, or the neighbors. Since ‘in-
correct’ behavior ranges from stealing a pen to smoking in a public place,
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it is highly unlikely that a respondent has never been a victim of this type
of behavior. Still, only about one quarter of the respondents reported be-
ing a victim of incorrect behavior, suggesting that the answer reflects the
respondent’s attitude or sensitivity towards social norm violations.
Since peer reporting may be associated with trust in other people (Trevino
and Victor, 1992), we used a trust index as one of our explanatory variables.
Questions on trust were not included in our survey, but they were asked to
the same panel of respondents in another CentERpanel survey, conducted
around the same time, entitled ‘Victims of (attempt to) fraud’ (Oudejans
and Vis, 2008). This survey was merged with our own data to obtain an
index for trust. Three questions were used to construct trust index:
• Do you think that, in general, most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be careful enough when dealing with people? Please answer
on a scale from 1 (you have to be careful) to 11 (most people can be
trusted);
• Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if
they would have the chance, or would they try to be honest? Please
answer on a scale from 1 (most people would try to make advantage of
me) to 11 (most people would try to be honest); and
• Do you think that people try to be helpful most of the time or do
they think mostly of themselves only? Please answer on a scale from 1
(people think mostly of themselves) to 11 (people try to be helpful).
3 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the respondent variables used in our analysis are pre-
sented in Table 1. Peer reporting and justifiability are the main variables of
interest (and the dependent variables in our econometric model); the other
variables are used as explanatory variables for peer reporting, justifiability,
or both. The corresponding variable definitions are listed in the Appendix,
Table A.2. We mentioned in Section 2 that the response rate is high, namely
83%. Still, the nonrespondents may have an effect on the estimates due to
selectivity bias. Upon further investigation we find that the average age of
the nonrespondents is 44.9 (50.7 for the respondents), urban middle is 0.25
(0.20 for the respondents), and hh lincome 7.79 (7.93 for the respondents).
A probit regression of key respondent characteristics on the binary response
variable confirms these results. Older people, in particular, are overrepre-
sented in our sample.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics — respondent characteristics
Binary Non-binary
Mean Std N Mean Std N
female 0.47 0.50 1931 age 50.68 16.13 1931
edu middle 0.31 0.46 1924 hh lincome 7.93 1.43 1931
edu high 0.36 0.48 1924 vict index 1.87 3.20 1919
urban high 0.41 0.49 1924 trust index 21.69 5.00 1635
urban middle 0.20 0.40 1924 social norm 7.01 1.33 1929
religion 0.58 0.49 1932 justifiability* 3.19 2.03 3840
victim small 0.25 0.44 1919
victim serious 0.12 0.32 1919
takematerial 0.33 0.47 1919
peer report* 0.66 0.47 3840
* = dependent variable.
Figure 1: Peer reporting
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Our principal dependent variable is peer report. About 66% of the re-
spondents would report a colleague if this colleague would take a bundle of
printing paper from the office for private use. As explained in Section 2,
labels 1–4 in Figure 1 refer to the situation where the respondent decides to
report, while labels 5–9 refer to the situation where the respondent does not
report. If respondents choose not to report the offense, it is usually because
they find the offense too futile to worry about it (label 8). Most respondents,
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if they report, choose to talk to the offender (label 1). Only 6 percent choose
to talk to another colleague, the boss, or someone else. One might argue that
only this small group literally reports the incorrect behavior of their peer;
those who talk to the offender take action but do not report the offense to
another person (at least not before talking to the offender first). Our main
interest is in whether any action is taken and this motivates the definition of
the peer reporting variable in the main analysis. However, we also investi-
gate (Section 5.3) if and how the results are affected when the definition of
peer report is changed so that only respondents who report (immediately) to
someone else are considered to peer report.
Figure 2: Justifiability
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Our second variable of main interest (used both as a dependent variable
and as an explanatory variable for peer reporting) is justifiability, and Fig-
ure 2 presents its empirical distribution. The mean and median are around 3.
Since a low value of justifiability means that the respondent does not find
the action justifiable, the figure shows that most respondents disapprove of
taking a bundle of printing paper home. Some authors claim that it is the
perceived severity of a small crime rather than its justifiability which should
play a role in the analysis (King and Hermodson, 2000; King, 1997). The
relationship between justice evaluations and the severity of a small crime was
discussed by De Graaf (2010) based on interviews performed with employees
of public organizations. He shows that the two concepts are closely related.
The explanatory variables include a set of basic socio-economic and de-
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mographic characteristics. The age of the respondents ranges from 15 to 93
with a mean of 51 (Table 1). Median household income before tax was about
AC2780 per month. A slight majority of the respondents is male. The three
levels of education are approximately equally represented: 33% of the re-
spondents have a ‘low’ level of education; 31% have attained the ‘middle’
level (edu middle=1); and 36% the ‘high’ level (edu high=1). About 41%
live in more urbanized areas (cities, urban high=1).
The other explanatory variables are specific to the current analysis. There
are three variables relating to victimization. In our sample of 1932 respon-
dents, 488 (25%) reported that they had been victim to a ‘small’ crime (vic-
tim small) in the past five years, and 226 (12%) that they had been victim
to a ‘serious’ crime (victim serious) during the same period. The range of
‘incorrect’ actions is wide, and this makes it unlikely that someone has never
been a ‘victim’ of incorrect behavior. The fact that only one quarter of the
respondents reported being a victim of incorrect behavior therefore suggests
that the answer may not only reflect victimization, but also the respondent’s
susceptibility to harm or injustice.
Figure 3: Severity of victimization
(a) Serious crime
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If a respondent reported having been victim of a crime (small or serious)
in the past five years, then the perceived severity of this crime (or the worst
of them, if they experienced more than one) was also asked (on a ten-point
scale: 1 is very severe, 10 is not severe). Figure 3 shows that a few victims
of a serious crime judge the crime to be very severe (1 or 2), while most
respondents find the crime rather severe (mode is 3), and only a few do not
find the crime severe at all. For small crimes the distribution is more even,
as one would expect. The average severity of a small crime is 5.3 (median
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is 5), and of a serious crime 4.5 (median 4). We constructed an index for
the degree of severity of victimization from these two variables (vict index)
ranging from 0 (not a victim of any crime) to 20 (victim of both small and
serious crime and both rated as very severe).
Respondents were also asked three questions relating to their own criminal
behavior. In particular, they were asked about shoplifting, taking materials
from work for private use, and claiming government benefits they were not
entitled to. Few respondents reported that they had committed these crimes
(which may or may not be truthful), with the exception of taking work
material home for private use (the variable takematerial). One third of the
respondents admitted having done this at least once, and 26% at least twice.
This variable is of interest because it relates closely to the vignette question
used in our analysis, and it allows us to verify whether the respondents’ own
incorrect behavior in a similar situation is associated with their action in the
hypothetical situation.
Ethical judgements of a situation and the reaction to it can also be in-
fluenced by religious views, social norms, and trust. The literature on moral
attitudes suggests that religious people hold more traditional views on moral
issues than non-religious people (Barnett et al., 1996). There is reason to
believe that people with a religion may respond differently to an unethical
act (in this case: taking a bundle of printing paper from the office for private
use). About 58% of our respondents reported being religious (interpreted in
a broad sense). Regarding social norms, we constructed a social norm index
as the average of the responses on severity (on a scale from 1 (not severe
at all) to 10 (very severe)) of a list of 18 offenses that differ in the level of
damage caused; see Table 2 in Douhou et al. (2011) for the 18 questions and
the mean answer to each of them. The overall mean (and the mean of our
index) is 7.01. A low value of the index means that the respondent considers
small crimes as less severe, indicating a lower value placed on social norms.
Finally, a variable measuring how much trust the respondent has in other
people can be important for one’s actions and beliefs in general (Deutsch,
1958), and for peer reporting in particular (Trevino and Victor, 1992). The
variable trust index is constructed as the sum of three variables, formulated
at the end of Section 2, that measure several aspects of a person’s trust, each
on a scale from 1 to 11 (a higher value means more trust), so that the trust
index ranges from 3 (very low trust) to 33 (maximum trust level). Since
these questions come from a different CentERpanel survey, they were asked
in a different week, and therefore they were not answered by all respondents
who answered our peer reporting and justifiability questions. This is why
we have fewer observations for this variable. (Respondents who answered
the trust questions but did not participate in our crime perception and peer
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Figure 4: Trust
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reporting survey are not included.) Figure 4 with a mode of 24 and a mean
of 21.7 shows that respondents on the whole appear to have trust in others.
4 Models
Each respondent i answers questions on two vignettes describing taking home
a bundle of printing paper from work for private purposes. In the first vari-
ant (t = 1) the offender’s income is AC1335; in the second variant (t = 2)
it is AC2500. In addition, several other aspects of the vignettes differ in a
randomized way, as described in Section 2. Our main dependent variable is
peer reporting (peer report, yit), and this is a binary variable: respondents
choose to report (yit = 1) or not to report (yit = 0) the offense for each of the
two vignettes. Observations on different respondents i are all assumed to be
independent of each other, but it is very likely that there is a positive cor-
relation between the two answers of the same respondent (t = 1 and t = 2),
and we shall take this correlation explicitly into account.
For this purpose we use the following bivariate probit model, which is
similar to a panel data probit model with random individual effects, where
t = 1 and t = 2 are the (two) time periods:
y∗it = β0 + x
′
itβ + δzit + ǫit (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2);
yit = 1 if y
∗
it > 0, yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0. (1)
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In our specification there are 21 regressors in the model: the constant term,
19 regressors {xit} (vignette characteristics and respondent characteristics
and attitudes), and the justifiability assessment zit, which plays a special
role (see below). Regarding the unobserved error terms ǫit we assume that
ǫi =
(
ǫi1
ǫi2
)
∼iid N2(0,Σ), Σ =
(
1 ρ1
ρ1 1
)
,
and also that ǫi is independent of xit. The specification implies that var(ǫi1) =
var(ǫi2); the fact that both are equal to one is a harmless normalization. The
parameter ρ1 is expected to be positive since ǫi1 and ǫi2 contain a common
individual-specific component (a random individual effect in panel data mod-
eling terminology).
In our first model, given in Equation (1), we assume that justifiability
zit is exogenous. This exogeneity assumption may, however, be criticized,
since both justifiability and peer reporting are choices of the same individu-
als, and it seems plausible that there are unobserved confounding factors —
unobserved variables that have an influence on both justifiability and peer
reporting. For example, people who do not tend to worry about relatively
minor issues may more easily qualify incorrect behavior as justifiable and
may also not think it is worthwhile to act upon incorrect behavior. This
leads to a (negative) correlation between zit and ǫit, making justifiability
potentially endogenous. In a linear model it would be natural to use an in-
strumental variables approach to deal with the endogeneity problem. Our
approach is similar in terms of identifying assumptions, but because of the
nonlinear nature of the model, we do not use instrumental variable estima-
tion as such. Instead, we add equations for assessed justifiability of the two
vignette offenses and estimate these equations jointly with the equations for
peer reporting (using maximum likelihood). By allowing for arbitrary cor-
relations between the error terms of the peer reporting and the justifiability
equations, we allow zit to be endogenous in the equation for yit.
To identify the model (other than through functional form assumptions),
we have to exclude at least one variable from the equation for yit that appears
in the equation for zit. For this purpose, we include three vignette variables
(a vector wit, our ‘instruments’) in the justifiability equation that are not
included in Equation (1): two dummies describing the relative wage of the
vignette person (vign wage low and vign wage high) and the probability of
getting caught given in the vignette (vign catch). These instruments indeed
contribute to explaining justifiability of the offense described in the vignette
(see Section 5), giving them enough power to serve as instruments. The key
identifying assumption that makes these three variables suitable instruments
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is that they do not to have a direct effect on peer reporting (keeping justifi-
ability constant). This seems a plausible assumption. There is no apparent
reason why there should be such a direct effect. Note that these variables
are part of the randomized design (they are vignette characteristics and not
respondent characteristics), so that they are by construction independent of
the unobserved confounding factors leading to correlation between zit and
ǫit. This also applies to the other vignette variables, but these might have
a direct effect on peer reporting. For example, behavior of the supervisor
(vign boss) may matter since a respondent may decide not to peer report if
the behavior of the supervisor indicates that the incorrect behavior is appar-
ently common in the organization, even though justifiability does not change.
For the three variables in wit no such argument applies.
The equation for justifiability is specified as follows:
z∗it = x
′
itα + w
′
itγ + ζit (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2),
zit = j if λj−1,t < z
∗
it ≤ λj,t (j = 1, . . . , 10; t = 1, 2), (2)
where
ζi =
(
ζi1
ζi2
)
∼iid N2(0,Ω), Ω =
(
1 ρ2
ρ2 1
)
,
and ζi is assumed to be independent of (xit, wit). Again, there is no loss
of generality in normalizing the Ω matrix. Like ρ1, we expect ρ2 to be posi-
tive, because of an individual-specific component in both justifiability assess-
ments. We allow ζi to be correlated with ǫi. More precisely, we assume that
the vector (ǫi1, ǫi2, ζi1, ζi2)
′ is multivariate normal with variances normalized
to one and with unrestricted correlation coefficients ρst = corr(ǫis, ζit). Since
unobserved respondent characteristics that are associated with a stronger
tendency of peer reporting are likely to be also associated with harsher as-
sessments of the vignette offenses, that is, to lower scores on the justifiability
scale (which runs from never justifiable to always justifiable), we expect the
four ρst correlations all to be negative.
The six correlations ρ1, ρ2, and ρst (s, t = 1, 2) are auxiliary model param-
eters to be estimated, as well as the thresholds λj,t (j = 1, . . . , 9; t = 1, 2).
We set λ0,t = −∞ and λ10,t = ∞. By means of normalization, there is
no constant term in (2). The four equations (1) and (2) (t = 1, 2) are es-
timated jointly by maximum likelihood using Roodman’s 2009 conditional
mixed process (CMP) routine.
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5 Results
We present the estimation results in Tables 2 (for the equation with justi-
fiability as the dependent variable) and 3 (for the equation in which peer
reporting is the dependent variable). In the second and third columns of
Table 3, labeled ‘exogeneity’, we assume that justifiability is exogenous and
explain peer reporting from the bivariate probit model (1) with exogenous zit.
In the fourth and fifth columns, labeled ‘endogeneity’, we allow justifiability
to be endogenous and present the estimates of the peer reporting equation
in the complete model given by (1) and (2). Table 2 reports the estimates
of the justifiability equation in this complete model. Table 4 presents the
estimated correlation structure of the error terms in the complete model.
The number of observations is always 1615, which is lower than the num-
ber of respondents to our survey because we included the variable (trust index)
based upon questions from another survey (see Sections 2 and 3), and not
all respondents of our small crime survey participated in this other survey.
From the three tables, we can draw three broad conclusions. First, most
of the exogenous variables have both a direct effect and an indirect effect
(via justifiability) on peer reporting. Second, the correlations between the
error terms of (1) and (2) in Table 4 are negative and significant, confirming
our hypothesis that justifiability should be treated as an endogenous vari-
able. The negative signs are also in line with what we expected: unobserved
respondent characteristics associated with a stronger tendency of peer report-
ing are also associated with lower justifiability scores. Third, in spite of this
finding, the differences between the estimates of the peer reporting equation
allowing and not allowing for endogeneity of justifiability are generally rather
small. We also note that ρ1 and ρ2 are close to one and that ρst ≈ −0.2 in
all four cases, irrespective of whether s = t or not (Table 4). This suggests
that the individual effects play a much larger role than the vignette-specific
idiosyncratic error terms.
5.1 Justifiability
Although our main interest is in the peer reporting estimates (the second
column in Table 3), we also briefly consider the estimates of the equation
for justifiability. These are reported in Table 2. The behavior of the boss
is important: if the offender’s boss behaves incorrectly according to the vi-
gnette, then the offense is considered more justified. First-time offenders are
evaluated less harshly. When the probability of getting caught is higher, the
incorrect behavior is considered less justified. If the offending employee in
the vignette receives a relatively low wage for the work he or she does, the
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Table 2: Regression results — justifiability
vign female 0.013 (0.024)
vign 43y 0.047 (0.029)
vign 55y 0.045 (0.029)
vign boss −0.253∗∗∗ (0.024)
vign freq −0.189∗∗∗ (0.024)
vign catch −0.064∗∗∗ (0.024)
vign wage low 0.074∗∗ (0.034)
vign wage high −0.022 (0.034)
female 0.030 (0.052)
age −0.001 (0.002)
hh lincome 0.004 (0.019)
edu middle −0.089 (0.064)
edu high −0.115∗ (0.063)
urban high 0.030 (0.057)
urban middle −0.036 (0.068)
religion −0.002 (0.051)
vict index −0.007 (0.016)
trust index −0.015∗∗∗ (0.005)
social norm −0.488∗∗∗ (0.022)
victim small −0.114 (0.102)
victim serious 0.024 (0.101)
takematerial 0.279∗∗∗ (0.057)
Dependent variable is justifiability;
standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
offense is considered more justifiable than if the employee receives a usual
or high wage (keeping other variables constant, including the absolute wage
level). Both vign catch and vign wage low (two of the three variables used
as instruments in the peer reporting equation, see Section 4) are significant
and the three instruments are also jointly significant, confirming that our
instruments have sufficient predictive power (conditional on the exogenous
variables xit) for the justifiability variable that is instrumented.
Neither having been a victim of a serious or a small crime, nor the victim-
ization index are significant, so that victimization has no apparent influence
on the justifiability assessments (keeping other variables constant). As ex-
pected, own involvement in employee theft (takematerial) is associated with
judging the hypothetical offender more lightly. A lower score on the social
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norm index implies that a respondent considers small crimes as relatively less
severe. Respondents with higher trust in others (a higher score on the vari-
able trust index) also tend to assess the offenses in the vignettes significantly
more harshly.
5.2 Peer reporting
Before we present the parameter estimates, we first discuss the results of
the tests based upon overidentifying restrictions: when the instruments are
included one by one in the peer reporting equation, they are always insignif-
icant (at the 5% level). We already saw that the instruments are jointly
significant in the justifiability equation (p-value is 0.000). Taken together
these results confirm the validity of our instruments.
In discussing the estimates of the peer reporting equation in Table 3, we
distinguish between three types of explanatory variables, following the analy-
sis of Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) in the context of whistleblow-
ing: characteristics of the offense, context of the offense, and characteristics
of the reporter.
Characteristics of the offense
There is only one variable in this group, namely justifiability. We know
from Figure 2 that most respondents disapprove of taking a bundle of print-
ing paper home. Justifiability has a significant negative effect on reporting:
respondents who disapprove more are more likely to report (keeping other
variables constant). This is not as trivial a result as it may appear, because
it shows that the potential respondent’s moral judgement plays a substantial
role in the decision whether or not to report. In our case, most respon-
dents find the ‘crime’ of taking a bundle of printing paper home too futile
(see Section 3), and would therefore not report it. Including justice evalua-
tion as a possible explanation for peer reporting was considered by Victor et
al. (1993), who distinguished between different forms of justice evaluations
(distributive, procedural, and retributive justice) and concluded that justice
evaluations matter for peer reporting. This is in line with our findings.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient (−0.161) implies that, for a
benchmark respondent with average peer reporting probability, an increase
of 1 in the justifiability score leads to a reduction of 0.059 in the probability
of peer reporting, keeping xit constant. Since the sample standard deviation
of the justifiability scores is 2.03, a one standard deviation increase would
lead to a fall in the probability of peer reporting of about 12 percentage
points. The effect is therefore not only statistically but also economically
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Table 3: Regression results — peer reporting
Exogeneity Endogeneity
vign female −0.007 (0.028) −0.008 (0.029)
vign 43y 0.001 (0.033) −0.002 (0.034)
vign 55y 0.026 (0.033) 0.024 (0.033)
vign boss 0.009 (0.028) 0.029 (0.030)
vign freq 0.098∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.029)
female −0.156∗∗∗ (0.051) −0.177∗∗∗ (0.068)
age 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
hh lincome −0.002 (0.021) 0.001 (0.024)
edu middle 0.122∗ (0.066) 0.166∗∗ (0.084)
edu high 0.110∗ (0.062) 0.153∗ (0.083)
urban high 0.008 (0.056) 0.024 (0.075)
urban middle −0.104 (0.066) −0.124 (0.088)
religion 0.021 (0.051) 0.029 (0.067)
vict index −0.020 (0.017) −0.029 (0.021)
trust index 0.013∗∗ (0.005) 0.015∗∗ (0.007)
social norm 0.045∗ (0.023) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.036)
victim small 0.323∗∗∗ (0.102) 0.390∗∗∗ (0.138)
victim serious 0.215∗∗ (0.106) 0.276∗∗ (0.137)
takematerial −0.107∗ (0.062) −0.154∗∗ (0.076)
justifiability −0.207∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.161∗∗∗ (0.032)
Loglikelihood −1226.42 −6122.62
Dependent variable is peer report; standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Table 4: Regression results — correlations
ρ1 ρ2 ρ11 ρ12 ρ21 ρ22
Exogeneity 0.97
(0.00)
Endogeneity 0.97 0.81 −0.15 −0.23 −0.16 −0.22
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Standard errors in parentheses
significant. According to the estimates in the second column of Table 3, the
effect of justifiability would be even larger if we assumed peer reporting to
be exogenous.
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Context of the offense
The context is captured by five vignette characteristics, relating peer report-
ing to the hypothetical situation (for example, behavior of the boss) and to
the hypothetical offender (for example, age and gender). Interestingly, we
find no evidence that peer reporting is influenced by the age of the offender,
nor by the fact whether the offender is a man or a woman. The behavior of
the boss does not matter, ceteris paribus. The only thing which does matter
is whether the offender has engaged in this type of incorrect behavior before
or not (vign freq).
Characteristics of the reporter
While we find no evidence that peer reporting is influenced by the age or gen-
der of the offender, the gender of the potential reporter does matter: Men
are significantly more likely to report than women (keeping other characteris-
tics constant, including justifiability and personal traits like trust and social
norms). This corresponds with other findings (Near and Miceli, 1985; Sims
and Keenan, 1998), although the reason for the different reporting behavior
of men and women is not clear. We find no significant effect for age. The lit-
erature is also ambiguous in this respect (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran,
2005; Sims and Keenan, 1998; Jones and Kavanagh, 1996). Neither do we
find a significant effect of income. Regarding education, we find not much
difference in reporting probability between respondents with a ‘middle’ or
a ‘high’ level of education. But there is difference with respondents with
a ‘low’ level—this group is less likely to report. If justifiability is assumed
endogenous then this difference is slightly larger than in the exogenous case.
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) cite studies that find an education
effect, but Sims and Keenan (1998) find no significant effect. Whether the
respondent lives in a city or in the country does not matter either. We find
no evidence that religious people are more likely to report than non-religious
people, possibly because religion has an indirect effect on reporting, through
ethical ideology (Barnett et al., 1996).
Trust (as measured by the trust index) is significantly associated with
peer reporting: More trust in others significantly increases the likelihood of
peer reporting, probably because a violation of trust affects trusting people
more than it affects suspicious people. Important is also the social norm
index, which measures the perceived severity of a wide range of situations of
incorrect behavior. We find, as expected, that someone who judges incorrect
behavior mildly (low value of social norm) is significantly less likely to report
such behavior, keeping justifiability and other variables constant. The size of
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the parameter estimate implies, for example, that a one standard deviation
decrease in social norm reduces the probability of peer reporting by about
5 percentage points for an average respondent. The effect of the social norm
is much stronger in the model allowing for endogeneity than in the model
assuming that justifiability is exogenous. While the existing literature em-
phasizes the importance of social context (Victor et al., 1993), we are not
aware of other studies on peer reporting that incorporate social norms.
New in the literature on peer reporting is also to consider past victimiza-
tion of the potential reporter. We include a victimization index (vict index)
which measures the perceived severity of the different types of crime a re-
spondent has possibly been a victim of, and we also include the fact whether
a respondent has been a victim of a small or a serious crime or not. We find
that victims of serious crimes and victims of small crimes are more likely to
report. The marginal effect of having been a victim of a small crime (an
increase of about 14 percentage points in the probability of reporting, for
the average respondent) seems to be larger than the effect of victim serious
(an increase of about 10 percentage points). Regarding the impact on one’s
behavior regarding a small crime, this implies that victimization of a small
crime has a larger impact than victimization of a serious crime.
Finally, we included a variable ‘takematerial’ which measures whether
the respondent him/herself has taken material from work for private use at
home. This allows us to see whether a person’s own past behavior in a similar
situation is of influence on the reporting decision. Note that takematerial is
negative and significant, which means that respondents that have been in a
similar situation as the offender in the vignette are less likely to report.
5.3 Peer reporting in a strict sense
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, answering ‘yes’ to the peer reporting ques-
tion means either that the respondent would talk to the offender or that
he/she would take the matter further and involve others. In fact, the large
majority of the respondents indicate that they would talk to the offender
and it is not clear whether they would then also talk to a supervisor, another
colleague, or someone else. In this subsection we redefine the peer reporting
dummy so that it takes the value 1 if the respondent would report the offense
to a supervisor, another colleague, or someone else; and 0 if the respondent
would only talk to the offender or not report the offense at all. This alterna-
tive definition of peer report (labeled peer report2) is more strict than the
previous one, and we have peer report2 = 1 for only 6 percent of the sample.
All results presented so far could be affected by the new definition. The
justifiability equation and the covariance structure of the errors are hardly
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affected, and the new results are therefore not presented. However, the re-
sults for the peer reporting equation are affected and these are presented in
Table 5.
Table 5: Regression results — peer reporting, alternative definition
Exogeneity Endogeneity
vign female −0.037 (0.055) −0.030 (0.050)
vign 43y 0.027 (0.067) 0.033 (0.061)
vign 55y −0.048 (0.067) −0.060 (0.061)
vign boss 0.005 (0.055) −0.054 (0.053)
vign freq 0.135∗∗ (0.057) 0.116∗∗ (0.054)
female −0.025 (0.074) −0.026 (0.095)
age −0.004 (0.003) −0.004 (0.003)
hh lincome −0.016 (0.025) −0.017 (0.032)
edu middle 0.051 (0.091) −0.074 (0.099)
edu high −0.034 (0.093) −0.183∗ (0.111)
urban high −0.224∗∗∗ (0.082) −0.255∗∗ (0.106)
urban middle −0.247∗∗ (0.101) −0.289∗∗ (0.129)
religion 0.014 (0.075) 0.014 (0.096)
vict index 0.000 (0.022) −0.001 (0.029)
trust index −0.012 (0.007) −0.015 (0.009)
social norm −0.048 (0.033) −0.100∗ (0.056)
victim small 0.134 (0.140) 0.134 (0.185)
victim serious 0.014 (0.139) 0.019 (0.182)
takematerial 0.054 (0.083) 0.107 (0.107)
justifiability −0.073∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.138∗∗∗ (0.049)
Loglikelihood −525.12 −5430.03
Dependent variable is peer report2; standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Since peer report2 is essentially different from peer report, we expect the
results in Table 5 to be different from those in Table 3. This is indeed the
case, but the main finding is the same: the probability of peer reporting
falls significantly with justifiability. In our preferred model allowing for en-
dogeneity of the justifiability variable, the coefficient of justifiability in the
peer reporting equation is very similar to the one in Table 3 (−0.138 ver-
sus −0.161). The standard error is larger, because of the small number of
respondents with peer report = 1. The effects of the vignette variables are
also similar to those in Table 3. The only significant variable is the dummy
indicating whether the offender has engaged in this type of incorrect behavior
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before; if so, this raises the probability that the respondent would report the
offense to someone else.
Some other parameter estimates are markedly different. The negative and
significant difference between women and men vanishes. Apparently, keeping
other variables constant, men talk to the offender more often than women,
but there is no evidence that they also report the offense more often to some-
one else. The effects of education change sign, but remain only marginally
significant. It seems that the higher educated are more inclined to talk to the
offender than to someone else. The strongest result is found for the degree
of urbanization: respondents in non-urbanized areas (the omitted category)
are significantly more likely to talk about their peer’s offense to someone else
than to the offender. On the other hand, the associations with victimization,
trust, and social norms all become insignificant. Respondents with stricter
social norms concerning the perception of small crime and respondents who
have been the victim of a crime in the past five years are more likely, when
observing the small crime, to talk to the offender than to report the offense
immediately to a supervisor or a colleague. The same applies to respondents
who have never committed a similar offense (take material = 0).
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered one ‘small crime’, namely taking printing
paper home from work for private use, and we asked in our survey whether
or not a colleague would report this crime. Peer reporting is viewed as a
behavioral response to the perception of fairness (i.e. justifiability) regard-
ing employee theft, because it may be considered an additional task for the
employee to help the management or to do justice (Victor et al., 1993). We
learn about the perception of fairness from the vignette question in which
the CentERpanel respondents were asked to rate the justifiability on a 10-
point scale. We find that situational characteristics, such as the behavior of
the offender’s boss and the probability of getting caught, influence fairness
perception. This perception is also influenced by characteristics of the re-
spondent him/herself, such as the level of trust in others and whether or not
the respondent committed employee theft him/herself. Fairness perception
and peer reporting are not influenced by age or income. But taking action
upon the offense does depend on education and gender. In particular, people
with low education level and women are less likely to act by talking to the
offender than higher educated people and men.
The most important aspect triggering peer reporting is the internal atti-
tude towards incorrect behavior. Other important aspects are fairness per-
23
ception, trust in others, and the potential reporter’s own behavior in a com-
parable situation of employee theft. New in the literature of peer reporting is
that we look at the reporter’s past victimization. We consider victimization
of incorrect behavior in general, and also victimization of a serious crime.
We find that the first type of victimization is mainly an attitude variable
towards misdemeanors in daily life. The range of misdemeanors a person
could possibly have been a victim of in the past five years is so wide that it
would seem impossible to find a person that never encountered such a situa-
tion. However, only one quarter of the respondents reported being a victim of
incorrect behavior, from which we conclude that this group contains people
with a greater awareness or sensitivity to social norms. We also find evidence
that serious crime victimization changes a person’s willingness to act after
noticing an offense, although this effect is smaller than the effect of small
crime victimization.
We also looked at reasons for people not to report a misdemeanor. The
most important reason for respondents not to report is that the misdemeanor
is not important enough to worry about. The loss to a company as a result
of stealing a bundle of printing paper is considered to be very small. This
is a well-known result: in general, people consider theft from a victim with
larger assets (in this case a company) easier to excuse (Greenberg and Scott,
1996).
We mention four possible extensions. First, one could consider group dy-
namics such as group norms and role responsibility. Such aspects have been
found to have an important impact on peer reporting (Victor et al., 1993),
but they are difficult to implement in the context of vignette questions, be-
cause the description of the hypothetical situation would become too long
and too complex. Second, one could look at more serious types of employee
theft (in terms of monetary losses to the employer), and ask whether peer re-
porting happens more often in large than in small organizations or vice versa.
Third, it may be the case that organizations with an established ethics pro-
gram have lower employee theft than organizations without such a program
(Greenberg, 2002). Possibly, an ethics program stimulates awareness to so-
cial norms in a company and creates a more open environment for allowing
employees to report. Fourth, while taking printing paper home for private
use would generally be considered as a very minor crime, two-thirds of re-
spondents would report it on average. Our current questionnaire does not
enable us to answer the question how this behavior changes with the severity
of offenses, since we observe peer reporting behavior only for one situation.
Still, this question is of interest and it would also help in differentiating with
justifiability.
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Appendix: Respondent and vignette variables
Table A.1: Binary vignette variables with explanation
vign female 1 if vignette person (vp) is a woman
vign 27y 1 if vp is 27 years old
vign 43y 1 if vp is 43 years old
vign 55y 1 if vp is 55 years old
vign boss 1 if the boss of the vp behaves correctly
vign freq 1 if small crime has been committed more often before
vign catch 1 if the probability of getting caught is 50% (0 if very small)
vign wage 1 if vp has a high wage
vign wage low 1 if vp receives low wage for type of work, given vign wage = 0
vign wage high 1 if vp receives high wage for type of work, given vign wage = 1
Table A.2: Respondent variables with explanation
Non-binary variables
age age of respondent (in years)
hh lincome log of gross monthly household income
vict index severity of crime respondent has been victim of (0 if no victim)
trust index degree of trust in other people (0 if no trust)
social norm average of answers to short questions on severity of 18 small
crimes on a scale from 1 (not severe at all) to 10 (very severe)
justifiability 1 = crime is never justifiable, 10 = — always justifiable
Binary variables
female 1 if respondent is a woman
edu middle 1 if respondent’s highest education level is higher general
secondary school or intermediate vocational training
edu high 1 if — higher vocational training or university
urban high 1 if respondent lives in an urbanized area
urban middle 1 if — in an area with intermediate urban character
religion 1 if respondent has a religion
victim small 1 if respondent was victim of incorrect behavior
victim serious 1 if — of a serious crime
takematerial 1 if respondent took material from the workplace
peer report 1 if respondent would peer report
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